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SUMMARY
The federal government implemented a new expenditure management system in 2007. Under
the new system, departments are required to review programs on a four-year cycle to
determine if they are aligned with federal responsibilities and priorities, if they are efficiently
delivered and if they are providing value for money, or effective. Based on the results from
these strategic reviews, which are expected to be supported by formal evaluations that provide
the evidence base for decisions, departments are expected to identify five per cent of their
direct program spending that could be reallocated to other priorities, including deficit
reduction. 
This system has much to recommend it, but to realize the full potential of the new system two
fundamental changes should be made. First, spending programs delivered through the tax
system should be integrated into the expenditure management system. Integration implies
that departments would be given responsibility for both tax and spending initiatives that are
relevant to their mandates, and that tax-based expenditures would be subject to the
government’s evaluation policy and be included in strategic reviews. 
Second, while departments should continue to have responsibility for evaluating program
efficiency, evaluations of both tax- and spending-program effectiveness should be undertaken
by an independent entity such as the Parliamentary Budget Officer. Effectiveness evaluations
should be carried out using a variant of the benefit-cost framework that is now applied to
government regulatory initiatives. In order for the reformed system to work, more resources
will need to be allocated to developing the performance data needed to undertake
effectiveness evaluations and to perform the evaluations.
These changes go well beyond a recent recommendation by a House of Commons committee
to include tax expenditures in departmental reports to Parliament, along with planned
program spending. The government rejected the recommendation, arguing that the change
would undermine the finance minister’s authority over the tax system. Reform cannot proceed
unless the finance minister relinquishes his power, exercised jointly with the prime minister, to
introduce, modify, or eliminate tax measures related to the mandate of a program minister
without the consent of the minister.
† This paper has benefited from comments by Ken McKenzie, Alan Nymark and an anonymous
referee. 
INTRODUCTION
A key innovation of the federal government’s expenditure management system implemented in
2007 is the use of ongoing strategic reviews to ensure that programs are aligned with federal
responsibilities and priorities, and that they are efficiently delivered and performing effectively.
These strategic reviews are expected to be underpinned by formal evaluations of program
performance undertaken by departments and publicly released. This approach has much to
recommend it, but there is an important gap. Governments use the tax system as a way to
achieve the same goals as program spending, but tax measures are not subject to the same
review process as program spending. 
Integrating tax expenditures, or more precisely, spending programs delivered through the tax
system,  into the expenditure management system would involve allocating the cost of tax
expenditures to the budget of the appropriate program department and requiring that they be
included in strategic reviews and be subject to the government’s evaluation policy. With
integration, departments would be aware of and be responsible for all policy measures relevant
to their mandate, which would make it easier to choose the most effective vehicle for achieving
program objectives and to identify and deal with overlap and duplication. Integration would also
involve changes to the government’s financial accounting and to reports to Parliament in order
to improve transparency and accountability. 
The federal government has previous experience with integrating tax expenditures into the
expenditure management system: an integrated system was implemented in 1979, but was
abandoned in the mid-1980s. According to one observer, the attempt at integration failed, in
part, because finance ministers over-used the discretionary power they had in the system. The
exclusion of existing tax expenditures, apparently because there was no consensus on how to
distribute them to departments, also played a role in the system’s demise. 
Determining which tax measures should be transferred to program departments requires
substantial judgement. The federal government identifies 200 tax expenditures in the 2011
edition of Tax Expenditures and Evaluations; these measures result in tax revenue forgone that
is well in excess of $100 billion. But a closer look at the listed measures indicates that many of
them are implemented with the intention of creating a fair and efficient tax system rather than
acting as a substitute for a spending program. The design of the tax system raises important
issues that have far-reaching impacts on society and the economy that should be analyzed and
debated, but not in the context of managing program spending or a deficit reduction exercise. 
Removing measures that are internal to the tax system reduces the number of tax measures that
should be included in an expenditure review exercise to 114 measures, with an aggregate value
of about $26 billion. By way of comparison, the dollar value of the program spending subject to
the government’s latest strategic review was $75 billion. 
Program evaluation does not appear to be fulfilling its intended role in the expenditure
management process or its role in promoting accountability to Parliament and Canadians
generally. A key shortcoming is that most published evaluations focus on administrative
efficiency of programs and do not often deal with their effectiveness and relevance (i.e.
alignment with government priorities and responsibilities). Evaluation managers reporting
publicly on program relevance and effectiveness would naturally be concerned about providing
information that could be used by political organizations to embarrass the minister and/or to set
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the political agenda. A better approach would therefore be to have an independent entity
evaluate program effectiveness and relevance while departments focus on evaluating program
efficiency. This recommendation applies with equal force to the tax expenditures identified in
this study. Finance Canada should continue to have responsibility for designing a fair and
efficient tax system and assessing the results, but tax expenditures as defined in this study
should be evaluated by a third party.
In addition, the evaluation methodology used could be improved to permit better assessments
of absolute and relative program effectiveness. Program evaluations should not only identify
programs that are performing poorly, but also help rank programs by relative effectiveness so
that funding can be reallocated to the most effective programs or, in the case of spending
restraint, so that the least effective programs can be eliminated. This objective could be
achieved by adopting the benefit-cost approach used by the federal government to assess
regulatory initiatives. 
In a benefit-cost framework, programs implemented to improve economic performance would
be assessed against their ability to contribute to a rise in living standards after all of the
program delivery costs have been considered. These costs include the expenses of
administering the program, the costs incurred by business in accessing the program as well as
the economic cost of financing the program with taxes that inevitably harm economic
performance through adverse effects on incentives to work, save and invest. Programs
implemented to alter the distribution of income would be assessed in terms of the costs
incurred in reaching the stated objective; but this analysis would have to be supplemented with
other information that would allow policy makers to perform their own subjective benefit-cost
analysis and ranking of alternatives.
The Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates recently tabled a report on
strengthening Parliamentary scrutiny of government spending. One of the committee’s
recommendations is that departmental reports tabled in Parliament that set out planned program
spending be expanded to include tax expenditures. Implementing this change would implicitly
give ministers of program departments some authority over tax expenditures in their areas of
responsibility and would have been a modest first step towards effective parliamentary scrutiny
of tax expenditures. The government rejected the recommendation, arguing that tax
expenditures, as part of the broader tax system, should remain the responsibility of the finance
minister. Reform of the expenditure management system along the lines proposed in this study
cannot proceed unless responsibility for tax expenditures that are substitutes for program
spending is transferred to program ministers. 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
The federal government introduced a new expenditure management system in 2007. A key
innovation of the new system is the requirement that program spending by every department
and agency be reviewed on a four-year cycle. More specifically, these “strategic reviews” cover
what is described as “direct” program spending, defined as program spending less major
transfers to other levels of government and individuals. Major transfers to other levels of
government include the Canada Health Transfer, the Canada Social Transfer, fiscal equalization
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3and territorial financing, while major transfers to individuals include elderly benefits (old age
security, the guaranteed income supplement and spousal allowances), children’s benefits and
employment insurance benefits. Background information on federal government spending is
presented in Annex A.
Federal departments are also required to undertake formal evaluations of direct program
spending on a five-year cycle.1 These evaluations are expected to provide evidence for use in
strategic reviews as well as to support accountability to Parliament and Canadians generally, in
particular by requiring the evaluations to be made public. There is also a requirement to
evaluate the major transfers,2 but unlike direct program spending there is no predetermined
cycle and there is no requirement to make the results public. On the other hand, since direct
program spending includes departmental operating costs, the delivery costs of major transfer
programs are implicitly included in the evaluation policy and therefore reviewed on a five-year
cycle. Further, the legislation governing major transfers to other levels of government has to be
renewed every five years and it is rare for the transfers to be renewed without modification.
While much of the analysis underpinning the changes is done in-house, the government also
makes use of external advisory bodies, such as the Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial
Formula Financing, which was set up in 2005. 
Strategic reviews are intended to identify programs, or program elements, that are no longer
aligned with government priorities or are not achieving expected results, and to generate
savings by reducing program delivery costs. Departments are typically required to identify five
per cent of their direct program spending that could be reallocated to other priorities, including
deficit reduction. To help achieve deficit reduction targets, Budget 2011 announced a special
one-year “strategic and operating review” that compressed the normal four-year cycle into a
single year. The review covered approximately $75 billion in direct program spending, which
was about 30 per cent of total program spending in 2011-12. Departments were asked to reduce
assessed program spending by almost seven per cent from levels projected for 2016-17, leaving
overall direct program spending virtually unchanged from its level in 2011-12 but about $3
billion lower than in 2009-10. 
Although tax expenditures were not part of the strategic and operating review, they were not
ignored in the deficit-reduction measures announced in Budget 2012. There was $600 million
in net savings from reducing tax expenditures compared to $5.2 billion in reductions to
departmental spending budgets.3 As explained below, the tax expenditure base is about 35 per
cent of the value of departmental spending that was reviewed in Budget 2012.
1 Treasury Board Secretariat, “Policy on Evaluation” (2009). (http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=15024
2 Treasury Board Secretariat, “Policy on Transfer Payments” (April 2012). http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-
eng.aspx?id=13525&section=text
3 The Scientific Research and Experimental Development investment tax credit was scaled back, generating annual
savings of $500 million when the changes are fully phased in. Reducing the generosity of the Atlantic Provinces
Investment Tax Credit and eliminating the overseas employment and the corporate mineral exploration tax credits,
generate additional savings of about $200 million. On the other hand, the ostensibly temporary mineral exploration
tax credit for flow-through investors was extended for another year (the credit was introduced on a temporary basis
in 2000) at a cost of $100 million. 
Public reporting and parliamentary oversight of government spending is an important element
of an effective expenditure management system. Parliamentary approval is required for all
government spending. Most spending is governed by specific legislation that does not require
annual approval by Parliament; but non-statutory spending, most of which is direct program
spending, must be “voted” by Parliament. The details of planned spending are tabled in the
House of Commons no later than March 1 each year in the Estimates.4 Part One of that
document presents the government’s overall expenditure plan (i.e. including both statutory and
voted expenditures). In addition, Part One provides information on major programs and
distributes spending across 10 major “sectors” (categories) such as social programs, industrial
support programs and cultural programs. Departmental spending by sector is also presented.
Part Two of the document, known as the “Main Estimates,” shows high-level budgetary
spending by department classified as voted and statutory spending as well as non-budgetary
transactions such as loans. It also provides detailed information on spending by department
classified by targeted strategic outcome and program activity as well as on non-statutory
transfers to persons and industry. 
Departments are required to prepare reports on their spending plans (Reports on Plans and
Priorities) and table them before Parliament shortly after the Estimates. They are also required
to table reports on spending outcomes (Departmental Performance Reports) in the fall. These
two reports, which are considered Part Three of the Estimates, present detailed, multi-year
information on spending by strategic outcome and program activity.
The audited financial statements of the federal government are presented in the Public
Accounts. The Accounts also contain details of revenues and expenditures by department,
which reflect in large measure the form and content of Part Two of the Estimates, although
there are some important differences.
Tax expenditures are not included in the expenditure management system, nor are they covered
by the government’s evaluation policy. Estimates of the tax revenue forgone through tax
expenditures are presented in Tax Expenditures and Evaluations, published by the Department
of Finance, but are not included in the expenditure plan tabled in Parliament and are only
partially included in the government’s financial accounts. 
The Parliamentary process for approving spending, which is known as the “business of supply”
since it supplies the government with revenues, was substantially changed in 1968. Prior to that
date, spending plans were reviewed by Parliament sitting as a Committee of the Whole and
were approved by a House vote, with no time limit on the approval process.5 Since 1968, a
supply calendar has been in place, which ensures that the government’s spending plans will
come to a vote within a specific time frame. In exchange, two changes benefitting the
opposition were made. First, the Opposition may choose the debate topic on all supply days,
which were initially set at 25 days and are now 22.6 Second, spending plans are reviewed by  
4 See the 2011-12 Estimates Parts I and II: The Government Expenditure Plan and The Main Estimates (www.tbs-
sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20112012/me-bpd/docs/me-bpd-eng.pdf) 
5 See evidence presented by Mr. Robert Marleau, clerk of the House of Commons, to a subcommittee on Procedure
and House Affairs, September 28, 1995.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Archives/Committee/351/sbus/evidence/01_95-09-28/sbus01_blk-e.html 
6 House of Commons Procedure and Practice, Second Edition (2009), Chapter 18, ‘The Business of Supply.’
(http://www.parl.gc.ca/procedure-book-livre/Document.aspx?Language=E&sbdid=F26EB116-B0B6-490C-B410-
33D985BC9B6B&sbpid=6E039746-E713-40D2-AEB8-46826181F5AB&Mode=1).
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separate Parliamentary committees, which have broad powers to examine spending, including
the right to question ministers and public servants. In order to ensure that the supply calendar is
respected, if these committees do not explicitly report concerns to the House during a set
period, the spending plans are deemed to have been reported back to the House for approval.7
The committee system was substantially strengthened by the creation of the Standing
Committee on Government Operations and Estimates in 2002. The mandate of this committee,
which is chaired by a member of the Opposition, includes the review of statutory programs and
tax expenditures. There is, however, widespread concern that Parliament does not fulfill its role
in scrutinizing government spending and “standing committees are at best giving perfunctory
attention to the government’s spending plans.”8
While the expenditure management system now in place has great potential for controlling the
level and improving the effectiveness of direct program spending, the omission of tax
expenditures is an important gap. The integration of tax expenditures into the expenditure
management system is discussed in the next section. 
INTEGRATION OF TAX EXPENDITURES INTO THE EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM 
The case for integration
The term “tax expenditure” was coined in the 1960s by Stanley Surrey9 in order to draw
attention to the fact that the tax system can be used to achieve economic and social objectives
in the same way as spending programs. This can be seen most clearly in the case of refundable
tax credits, which are paid even if the recipient has no tax liabilities. A refundable tax credit is
identical to a spending program with no funding cap, a fact recognized by a new Public Sector
Accounting Board (PSAB) standard that requires refundable credits to be reported as expenses.
While a non-refundable tax credit cannot exactly duplicate the impact of a spending program,
because benefiting from the credit is conditional on having tax liabilities, the need for
transparency, accountability and assessment of performance does not change if a program is
delivered through the tax system instead of as a direct spending program. There is no
substantive difference between, for example, a spending program that provides assistance for
business investment and a tax credit provided for the same purpose.
The need for symmetric treatment of tax expenditures and program spending was most recently
recognized in Ontario’s Drummond report,10 which contained a little-noticed recommendation
to consolidate spending and tax-funding of business support programs into a single envelope so
7 For additional detail see A Guide to the Estimates.
(http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0925-e.htm#a11)
8 House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, Strengthening Parliamentary
Scrutiny of Estimates and Supply (June 2012).
(http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=5690996&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=
1&File=18)
9 See Jonathan Barry Forman, "Origins of the Tax Expenditure Budget," Tax Notes, vol. 30, no. 6 (February 10, 1986)
p. 538.
10 Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public Services, “Public Services for Ontarians: A Path to Sustainability and
Excellence,” recommendation 11-5.
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that departments would be aware of, and be responsible for, all policy measures relevant to
their mandate. This approach could be applied to all tax expenditures, not just those providing
support for business, and a number of ancillary changes to the expenditure management system
would be required to make the treatment of tax expenditures and program spending completely
symmetric. Integration of tax expenditures into the expenditure management system requires
that tax expenditures be allocated to the budgets of spending departments and that they be
included in strategic reviews and be subject to the government’s evaluation policy. Integration
also implies that tax expenditures would be included in the government’s financial accounts
and other reports to Parliament. 
Integration of tax expenditures into the expenditure management system has the advantage of
encouraging a “whole-of-government” approach to program delivery: lead departments would
see, and be responsible for, all government programming on a particular issue, which should
lead to better decision making.11 For example, including tax expenditures in an expenditure
reduction/containment exercise would pay dividends in terms of equity, effectiveness and
efficiency:  
• By considering both tax and spending initiatives, the burden of controlling spending or
achieving deficit reduction targets will be spread more fairly across the beneficiaries of
government spending.
• The perceived fairness of the exercise will make it easier to implement the required
changes.
• By identifying the least effective spending and tax measures, the economic cost of
expenditure reduction can be minimized.
Previous experience
Tax expenditures were included in the Policy and Expenditure Management System (PEMS) in
effect from 1979 to 1989, but the experiment was not successful and was abandoned in the
mid-1980s. As the name implies, one of the aims of PEMS was to bring together the policy
development and expenditure management functions of government.12 The process started with
preparation of a five-year fiscal projection by the Department of Finance. The fiscal framework
was used by a cabinet committee to set the overall level of spending, which was allocated to
broad “envelopes” each of which were capped, so that programs not included in the fiscal
framework had to be funded by reallocating spending within an envelope. Ministers had
considerable flexibility on how to allocate the funding within an envelope. The key features of
the integration of tax expenditures into PEMS were:13
• The minister of finance retained the authority to implement new tax measures, but the
introduction of measures in specific program areas required the concurrence of the relevant
minister and cabinet committee. 
11 Even larger benefits would be available if, at the same time, the government ensured that program spending is
allocated to departments in a way that allows them to have responsibility for all measures relevant to their mandate.
12 For a summary of the PEMS, see Patrick Grady and Richard Phidd, “Budget Envelopes, Policy Making and
Accountability,” Economic Council of Canada Discussion Paper 93-16.
13 See Satya Poddar, "Integration of Tax Expenditures into the Expenditure Management System: The Canadian
Experience," in Tax Expenditures and Government Policy, ed. Neil Bruce, (Kingston: John Deutsch Institute for the
Study of Economic Policy, 1988) pages 259-268.
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• The cost, or savings, resulting from tax changes implemented by the minister of finance
were not automatically charged to spending envelopes, although they could be reflected in
allocations for future years.
• Tax expenditures proposed by program departments were submitted to the minister of
finance for assessment of technical and administrative feasibility. The revenue cost of new
or expanded measures were automatically debited against the appropriate funding envelope,
but allocating cost savings from scaling back existing measures required approval of the
minister of finance and the relevant cabinet committee because they involved tax increases. 
• Existing tax expenditures were not allocated to spending envelopes, apparently because
there was no consensus on how they should be allocated.14
Given the incentive structure of the new system, program ministers stopped proposing new tax
expenditures, but lobbied the finance minister to initiate tax measures relevant to their
mandate. There was also an initial flurry of requests to replace tax expenditures with program
spending. The minister of finance rejected these requests on the grounds that expenditure
control should not result in higher program spending financed by higher taxes.15
In his assessment of why integration of tax and spending programs was not successful, Poddar
emphasizes the over-use of the discretion provided to the minister of finance in allocating costs
and savings to spending envelopes, which created the impression that the system did not have
to be adhered to. Poddar also mentions the exclusion of existing tax measures as a factor
contributing to the failure of integration, which made the system appear to be arbitrary. For
example, the Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) tax incentive and
registered retirement plans were both enriched in the early 1980s by the minister of finance
without consulting other ministers. These measures were widely viewed as tax expenditures,
but the changes were made without any impacts on spending envelopes.16 Exclusion of existing
tax measures likely also contributed to the concern that converting tax expenditures to program
spending amounted to financing higher program spending with tax increases: if the cost of the
tax measure had been included in the budget of the department making the proposal, the switch
would have been more likely viewed as neutral from the perspective of both the government
and recipient firms. 
A proposal for an integrated system
This section provides the broad outline for a reformed expenditure management system,
drawing on Canada’s past experience and an assessment of potential pitfalls. In order to
maximize the benefits from integration, existing tax expenditures would have to be allocated to
the budget of the relevant spending department, which would then absorb the cost or savings
arising from any modifications to the measures. Allocating existing tax expenditures to
spending departments means that tax expenditures as reported by Finance Canada have to be
14 Ibid., p. 263.
15 Patrick Grady and Richard Phidd, “Budget Envelopes, Policy Making and Accountability,” Economic Council of
Canada Discussion Paper 93-16, p. 58.
16 Satya Poddar, "Integration of Tax Expenditures into the Expenditure Management System,” p. 266.
7
carefully reviewed to determine which ones are substitutes for program spending; this issue is
discussed in detail below. As an illustration of how the allocation of existing tax expenditures
would be carried out, consider the following:17
• Funding for the SR&ED investment tax credit would become part of the Industry Canada
portfolio, which now includes most spending programs that provide support for business
R&D and innovation, including venture capital financing;
• All tax measures providing support for small business that are not specific to R&D and
innovation (e.g. the low tax rate for small businesses, the lifetime capital-gains exemption
for small business shares) would be allocated to the small business component of Industry
Canada’s portfolio, which now includes the Small Business Financing Program as well as
advisory services provided to small business;
• All tax measures providing benefits to older Canadians (e.g. the age credit, the pension
income credit, pension income splitting and the non-taxation of the guaranteed income
supplement and allowances) would become part of Human Resources and Skills
Development Canada’s portfolio. More specifically, these measures would be part of the
income security sub-component of the portfolio that includes expenditure programs such as
old age security, the guaranteed income supplement and allowances; and,
• Tax expenditures supporting arts and culture (e.g. the children’s arts tax credit, donations of
cultural property and the Canadian film or video production tax credit) would become part
of the Canadian Heritage portfolio.
The role of the minister of finance has to be carefully considered to promote successful
integration of tax expenditures into the expenditure management system. The minister of
finance has the prerogative, exercised jointly with the prime minister, to introduce, modify or
eliminate tax measures related to the mandate of a program department without the
concurrence of the relevant minister. This power would be lost if tax-delivered programs were
the responsibility of spending departments. In contrast, the minister of finance should continue
to have the power to propose new tax-based spending programs, but implementation would
require the consent of the affected minister and the relevant cabinet committee. 
Further, the finance minister would retain sufficient authority to maintain an efficient and
coherent tax system. More specifically, proposals to implement new tax expenditures would
only be accepted if the minister of finance deems them to be administratively and technically
feasible. In addition, program ministers proposing to shift delivery from the tax system to
program spending, or vice versa, would have to demonstrate the existence of a net benefit from
the change, either from lower costs or from improved effectiveness. In order to provide the
right incentive for departments to choose the most efficient delivery method, program delivery
costs of the Canada Revenue Agency should be attributed to spending departments.
A reformed expenditure management system would include improved accounting for tax
expenditures. Some progress has already been made as a result of adopting the new Public
Sector Accounting Board standard requiring that the cost of refundable tax credits be added to
program spending and budgetary revenues.18 Prior to this change, most refundable tax credits 
17 See Annex C for a complete allocation of tax expenditures by department.
18 Public Sector Accounting Board Standards apply to all governments and government organisations in Canada. The
federal government implemented the new standard in the 2012 Economic and Fiscal Update.
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were netted against tax revenues, which caused both program spending and tax revenue to be
understated. An important exception was the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB), which is a
$10 billion spending program delivered through the tax system. In response to numerous
observations by the auditor general,19 in 2006 the government removed the CCTB from the tax
expenditure accounts and began reporting it as program spending in the Public Accounts of
Canada,20 in the budget and in the Annual Financial Report of the Government of Canada.
However, spending on the CCTB is not included in the Estimates tabled in Parliament each
year, which is not consistent with Parliament’s role in approving and monitoring spending by
the government. Further, the public accounts assign responsibility for the CCTB to the Canada
Revenue Agency instead of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, which has
responsibility for other transfers to persons, including the Universal Child Care Benefit, that
are also delivered through the tax system. 
The treatment of the CCTB demonstrates that simply adding the cost of refundable tax credits to
budgetary revenues and expenditures is only a first step to improved transparency and
accountability: responsibility for tax-based spending programs should also be attributed to the
appropriate spending department and be included in expenditure management documents tabled
before Parliament. Further, it is important to note that refundable credits account for only about
15% of tax-based spending programs. All tax-based spending programs should be presented in
the Estimates (including departmental performance reports and reports on plans and priorities)
so that Parliament has a complete picture of spending. Over the longer term, the government
should develop options for revising the Public Accounts to report tax revenue gross of non-
refundable credits and to include these credits in program spending. These changes to financial
reporting would help offset the perception, discussed above, that elimination of tax expenditures
amounts to sustaining existing levels of spending with higher taxes.
Integration of tax expenditures into the expenditure management system also implies that these
programs would be subject to the federal government’s evaluation policy, which requires that
all direct program spending programs be evaluated on a five-year cycle. This cycle would be
appropriate for tax measures as well. Access to taxpayer data that would be required to
evaluate tax-based programs is governed by Section 241 of the Income Tax Act. That section
now contains a lengthy list of exemptions to the basic principle that only the Canada Revenue
Agency has access to taxpayer data. Nevertheless, the section would have to be amended to
allow departments to have access to the data required to undertake evaluations of tax-based
programs. There is an exemption for provincial government officials in order to accommodate
the need for data to formulate or evaluate fiscal policy;21 the same sort of exemption could be
provided to federal departments. 
With integration, tax-based spending programs would also be included in strategic reviews,
along with other spending, which would improve the equity, efficiency and effectiveness of
these reviews, as discussed above.
19 See, for example, Chapter 17 of the 2000 October Report of the Auditor General of Canada. (http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_200010_17_e_11204.html#0.2.H2OZPJ. LKDILD.YXYU1G.A)
20 See summary Table 2a in the Public Accounts of Canada (2011).
21 Section 241(4)(d)(iv) of the Income Tax Act.
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Recommendations by the government operations and estimates committee
The House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates
released a report on strengthening Parliamentary scrutiny of estimates and supply in June of
this year.22 Two of the committee’s 16 recommendations touch on the integration of tax
expenditures into the expenditure management system.
In recommendations 12 and 13, the committee advocates that departments and agencies include
tax expenditures in their reports on plans and priorities, and that standing committees charged
with reviewing the Estimates assess these tax expenditures at least once every eight years to
determine if they are achieving their intended objectives. The tax expenditures reported in
Finance Canada’s Tax Expenditures and Evaluations would be allocated to departments by the
Treasury Board to best fit their mandates. Adopting these recommendations would be a
substantial movement towards effective scrutiny of tax expenditures and could be seen as the
first in a series of steps leading to full integration of tax expenditures into the expenditure
management system. It is likely that including tax expenditures in reports on plans and
priorities would lead to suggestions that they be included in departmental performance reports.
Further, since these two reports make up Part Three of the Estimates, the logical next step
would be to include tax expenditures in Parts One and Two of the Estimates. Finally, once tax
expenditures are included in departmental performance reports, departments would be
responsible for reporting on their performance, which could eventually draw tax expenditures
into the government’s evaluation policy. 
Integration of tax expenditures into the expenditure management system raises two other
important issues. First, not all tax expenditures reported by Finance Canada are substitutes for
program spending, so some background work to determine which measures should be
transferred to other departments is required. Second, reforms to program evaluation are
required for it to realize its potential contribution to expenditure management. These issues are
discussed in the next two sections. 
WHICH TAX MEASURES SHOULD BE INCLUDED?
The discussion in the preceding section alluded to the idea that not all tax expenditures should
be included in an expenditure review exercise. The federal government identifies 200 tax
expenditures in the 2011 edition of Tax Expenditures and Evaluations; these measures result in
tax revenue forgone well in excess of $100 billion. (This is a rough estimate; see Box 1 for a
discussion of the pitfalls arising from adding up the estimates for individual measures.) Tax
Expenditures and Evaluations explicitly takes a broad view of what constitutes a tax
expenditure, with the result that many measures that could be considered part of a fair and
efficient tax system are included as tax expenditures. The intention is to provide information on
a full range of measures that can be used by analysts and parliamentarians to address a variety
of issues. 
22 House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, Strengthening Parliamentary
Scrutiny of Estimates and Supply (June 2012).
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The interest in this study is to determine which measures reported in Tax Expenditures and
Evaluations are close substitutes for spending programs and should therefore be integrated into
the expenditure management system. This exercise is similar to the U.S. approach of preparing
tax-expenditure estimates for two different “baselines” or benchmarks: normal tax law and
Box 1: Adding Tax Expenditures
In Tax Expenditures and Evaluations, the
revenue cost of each tax measure is
calculated assuming all other measures
remain unchanged. As a result, summing
the cost of individual measures will not
provide an accurate estimate of the
revenue gain that would occur if the
measures were eliminated simultaneously.
With a progressive personal income tax
system, eliminating more than one
measure at a time could result in greater
revenue losses than the sum of the losses
for each measure. Consider, for example, a
taxpayer taking advantage of the non-
taxation of business-paid health and dental
benefits as well as the northern residents’
deduction. Eliminated together, some of
the additional taxable income could be
taxed at a higher marginal rate than when
just one of the measures is eliminated. A
similar analysis applies to credits. For
example, a low-income taxpayer may be
taking advantage of several tax credits,
any one of which reduces tax liabilities to
zero; in these circumstances, the tax
revenue forgone for this taxpayer would be
zero for each measure when considered
individually, but their combined effect
would be positive. 
As a result, summing the individual
estimates for personal income tax
measures will understate the true cost of
maintaining all of the measures. While the
direction of bias is easy to predict,
quantifying its magnitude requires access
to the tax micro-data and use of a tax
simulation model. Estimates of the
aggregation bias have not been prepared
for Canada, but a U.S. study indicates that
interaction effects cause the sum of
personal income tax expenditures to be
understated by five to eight per cent,
depending on whether the alternative
minimum tax is excluded or included in the
analysis.a Note that the size of the bias
will vary over time if the distribution of
income and the number and type of
personal income tax measures change. 
The business income tax also has a
progressive rate structure, so summing the
individual measures also understates the
cost of maintaining business-related tax
expenditures; but the bias is smaller than
for personal tax measures because there
are fewer tax brackets. 
In contrast to the personal income tax
measures, summing the individual GST tax
expenditures overstates the cost of
maintaining all of the measures. Some
entities supplying goods and services in a
non-commercial context benefit from both
an exemption — which means that the
entity does not collect GST on its sales —
and a rebate of GST paid on their
purchases. Separate estimates for the cost
of exemptions and rebates are provided;
but these estimates are not independent:
the rebate has no cost in the absence of
the exemption since without the
exemption the entity is able to claim a
refund for the GST paid on its purchases.
As a result, adding the two cost estimates
overstates the cost of maintaining both by
the amount of the rebate.b In this study,
the only exemption/rebate combinations
retained as tax expenditures relate to
charities and non-profit organizations; the
cost of the rebates, which was about $350
million in 2011, is excluded from the tax -
expenditure estimates.
a Burman, Leonard, Eric Toder and
Christopher Geissler, “How Big are Total
Individual Income Tax Expenditures and
Who Benefits from Them?” The Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center, Discussion
Paper 31 (2008).
b See Finance Canada, Tax Expenditures:
Notes to the Estimates/Projections 2010,
p. 16, for additional detail. 
reference tax law.23 The normal tax-law baseline is similar to the benchmark used in Tax
Expenditures and Evaluations, although it is not as broad. In contrast, “[r]eference law tax
expenditures are limited to special exemptions from a generally provided tax rule that serve
programmatic functions in a way that is analogous to spending programs.”24 In this study, tax
expenditures reported by Finance Canada are reclassified into structural measures, defined as
provisions that are related to designing a fair and efficient tax system, and measures that could
reasonably be considered substitutes for program spending. 
The most obvious examples of structural measures relate to federal-provincial fiscal relations.
Tax Expenditures and Evaluations includes 17 measures that transfer tax revenue to, or reduce
taxes on, other levels of government (Table 1). These measures include the transfer of income-
tax points to the provinces and the Quebec Abatement, which accounted for approximately $24
billion in tax expenditures in 2011. GST measures that reduce the taxes paid by municipalities,
universities, colleges, schools and hospitals account for an additional $5 billion in forgone tax
revenues.
TABLE 1: CLASSIFICATION OF MEASURES IN THE 2011 EDITION OF TAX EXPENDITURES AND EVALUATIONS1
1 Source: Finance Canada Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2011. 
2 Changes from the Finance Canada presentation comprise including donations of securities with charitable donations;
separation of the Registered Homebuyers' Plan from estimates for Registered Retirement Savings Plans; and exclusion
of rebates for registered charities and other non-profit organizations. Memorandum items are not included. 
The classification of measures related to the costs associated with post-secondary education
(PSE) raise some interesting issues. The additional income earned as a result of pursuing PSE
is subject to tax, so allowing the deduction of tuition fees and other direct costs associated with
23 See Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the U. S. Government, Fiscal Year 2011, published by the Office of
Management and Budget. 
24 Ibid., p. 208.
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Number of measures in effect in 20112 111 55 30 196
less measures that:
Transfer tax revenue to or reduce taxes on other levels of government 3 2 12 17
Recognize expenses incurred to earn income 12 0 0 12
Promote horizontal equity 13 0 2 15
Promote vertical equity 0 0 2 2
Relate to the choice of tax unit or calendar year taxation 5 1 0 6
Promote administrative simplicity 3 2 3 8
Relate to the taxation of investment income 7 2 0 9
Relate to the taxation of housing 1 0 4 5
Relate to international taxation 0 8 0 8
Total structural measures 44 15 23 82
Tax Expenditures included in the analysis 67 40 7 114
Cost estimates not available 15 10 1 26
Tax Expenditures quantified 52 30 6 88
Personal Corporate Goods and Total
Income Income Services
Tax Tax Tax 
PSE would amount to recognition of costs incurred to earn income. Note, however, that these
costs are recognized through a tax credit based on the first bracket tax rate, so there is a case
for evaluating the measures as negative tax expenditures. On the other hand, since students are
allowed to deduct expenses as they are incurred, allowing a credit for interest on loans and the
transfer of unused credits goes beyond cost recognition and provides tax assistance to
students.25
Another set of tax expenditures in the document is intended to promote horizontal equity, which
is the notion that taxpayers in similar circumstances should pay similar amounts of tax.
Measures in this category include the medical expense tax credit, which provides tax relief for
above-average medical or disability-related expenses, and the disability tax credit. Both of these
measures indirectly adjust taxable income to partially compensate for extraordinary expenses
that do not contribute to consumption enjoyment. There are 15 measures implemented to
promote horizontal equity, accounting for about $4 billion in forgone tax revenue.
Two GST tax expenditures — the GST credit and the zero-rating of basic groceries — included
in the document are intended to promote vertical equity, that is: to create a progressive tax
structure.26 As a result, these measures are similar to the basic personal amount, which is not
considered a tax expenditure. These two measures account for $7 billion in forgone tax revenue. 
Six measures included in the document make adjustments to improve tax fairness by making
adjustments to taxation of individuals rather than families and to calendar year taxation. For
example, the spouse or common-law-partner credit could be viewed as a method of reducing
the tax burden on families. In contrast, pension-income splitting, which is a more explicit form
of joint tax filing, is retained as a tax expenditure in this study because it is available only to
taxpayers with pension income. Calendar year taxation can have some unintended
consequences. For example, retroactive wage increases paid in a lump sum can push recipients
into a higher tax bracket than if the income had been received as earned. A special tax
computation to prevent this outcome is included in Tax Expenditures and Evaluations as a tax
expenditure; this measure, which involves only a small amount of tax revenue forgone, is more
appropriately considered to be a structural tax measure implemented to improve tax fairness. 
Another set of measures relates to administrative simplicity. For example, the small suppliers’
threshold for registering and collecting the GST is in place to avoid imposing excessive
compliance costs on very small businesses. In addition, certain Crown corporations that do not
benefit from constitutional immunity from taxation are exempt from federal taxes in order to
reduce compliance and administration costs. 
There are nine measures classified as tax expenditures that relate to the taxation of income from
capital relative to wage income; in this study the relative tax burden on capital and labour
income is considered a tax policy issue rather than a spending issue. These measures include the
25 There is a parallel with a business cash flow tax: allowing firms to deduct investment expenses as they are incurred
means that interest expense incurred to finance the investment should not be deductible. 
26 The exemption for basic groceries may not be the most cost-effective way of promoting vertical equity, because the
relatively well-off spend more per capita on basic groceries in absolute terms than others. As a result, taxing
groceries and using some of the proceeds to increase the GST credit would result in a more progressive tax. For a
detailed discussion, see Michael Smart, “Departures from Neutrality in Canada’s Goods and Services Tax,”
University of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper, Volume 5, Issue 5, February 2012. 
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provision of registered accounts (registered pension plans, registered retirement savings plans
and tax-free savings accounts) that reduce the tax burden on savings, the partial inclusion of
capital gains in taxable income and the deferral of tax on capital gains until they are realized.
These measures account for about $33 billion in tax revenue forgone. In contrast, measures that
provide tax relief on capital income for specific sectors or activities, such as the lifetime
capital-gains exemption (LCGE) for capital gains on small business shares, are classified as tax
expenditures in this study.
Most measures for housing are excluded from the tax expenditure category. The measures
excluded are the exemption of capital gains on the sale of principal residences, the GST
exemption for residential rent and the rebates for new housing and new residential property.
These measures provide tax relief for a specific activity, which suggests that they should be
included in the tax expenditure category. Further, the capital-gains exemption is similar to the
lifetime capital-gains exemption (LCGE), which is considered a tax expenditure. However,
considering these measures in the context of the overall tax treatment of housing ownership
provides a different perspective. Ideally, the tax burden on owner-occupied and rented housing
would be the same and similar to the tax burden on other investments. Dealing with these four
measures in isolation could result in movement farther from, rather than closer to, the ideal
state. As a result, it is more appropriate to consider these measures as structural provisions that
should be assessed in the context of the overall tax treatment of housing, including taxes
imposed by other levels of government, than as substitutes for spending programs.
The final set of reported tax expenditures reclassified as structural measures in this study relate
to international taxation. These measures include unilateral exemptions from withholding taxes
on various types of income paid to non-residents27 and the tax treatment of foreign source
income of Canadian multinational enterprises.28 The tax treatment of income earned in Canada
by non-residents and the foreign source income of Canadians involves fundamental choices
about the design of the tax system, in much the same way as the relative tax burden on wage
and investment income. For example, solid arguments can be made both for imposing Canadian
taxes on repatriated profits of foreign affiliates (with a deduction or credit for foreign taxes paid)
and for exempting them from Canadian tax. The choice should be made after considering the
costs and benefits to Canada, but there would be no reason to consider the approach adopted as
a substitute for a spending program. In contrast, the tax treatment of expenses incurred when
investing in foreign affiliates clearly provides preferential tax treatment of foreign direct
investment29 and does not raise any tax design issues. Similarly, the tax exemption for
international banking centres is considered as a substitute for a spending program.
It is important to emphasize that classifying tax measures as internal to the tax system and as
substitutes for program spending involves judgment and assumptions with which reasonable
people can disagree. While most analysts will not find classification of measures that transfer
tax revenues to other levels of government as internal to the tax system problematic, other
decisions may be more controversial. One example is the classification of most measures 
27 Exemptions and reductions granted under treaties are not considered tax expenditures.
28 Under Canadian tax law, active business income of a foreign affiliate is not taxed in Canada provided that the income
is earned in a country having a tax treaty or a tax information exchange agreement with Canada.
29 Interest and other expenses related to an investment in a foreign affiliate can generally be deducted in Canada, even
if these expenses have been deducted by the affiliate in computing tax liabilities in the host country.
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relating to the taxation of housing as structural. The decision to treat almost all deviations from
the statutory GST rate as structural measures may also raise questions. More specifically, the
special treatment of food and public-sector bodies is considered to be internal to the tax
system, leaving very few narrowly-defined GST tax expenditures. The underlying principle is
that the design of a broad-based tax like the GST, in particular establishing the trade-off
between efficiency and equity, should be determined outside of an expenditure review
process.30
Removing all measures that can be loosely described as internal to the tax system reduces the
number of tax measures that should be included in an expenditure review exercise from 196 to
114. However, cost estimates are not available for 26 of these measures (Table 1). One of the
more important omissions is the cost of providing accelerated deduction of capital costs for
certain assets. Given that capital expenditures cannot generally be deducted from taxable
income as they are incurred, tax neutrality requires that capital costs be deducted over the
useful life of the capital asset. Finance Canada31 identifies 11 asset classes for which tax
depreciation allowances are more rapid than warranted, given the useful lives of the assets.
These include machinery and equipment used in manufacturing and processing, computer
equipment, vessels, Canadian exploration expenses and current expenditures on scientific
research and development.  
The tax expenditures identified in this study for which cost estimates are available had an
aggregate value of about $26 billion32 in 2011, which represents 14.5 per cent of federal tax
revenues, 22 per cent of direct program spending and about 11 per cent of overall program
spending. Business income tax expenditures represented an above-average share of corporate
income tax revenues at 26 per cent. Personal income tax expenditures were a slightly below
average share, while GST measures were substantially a below-average percentage of GST
revenues. The tax revenue forgone from the top five tax expenditures was approximately $15
billion, or about 55 per cent of the aggregate tax revenue forgone in 2011 (Table 2).33
TABLE 2: LARGEST TAX EXPENDITURES IN 2011 ($millions)
Source: Finance Canada Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2011
30 For a comprehensive discussion of GST design issues, see Michael Smart, “Departures from Neutrality in Canada’s
Goods and Services Tax” (2012).
31 Tax Expenditures: Notes to the Estimates/Projections (2010), pages 65 - 71.
32 This is the sum of the individual cost estimates presented in Tax Expenditures and Evaluations. As explained in Box
1, the sum of the individual costs understates the true cost of maintaining all of the measures.
33 Note that the tax revenue forgone through the low rate for small business is overstated. Small business owners can
take advantage of the low rate as long as the net income earned is retained in the firm; when retained earnings are
paid out as dividends they are subject to personal income tax, less a credit for business taxes paid. The low rate for
small business income amounts to a tax deferral that results in a smaller revenue loss than reported in Tax
Expenditures and Evaluations. No estimate of the adjusted cost is available.
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SR&ED investment tax credit 3655
Low tax rate for small business 3555
Non-taxation of business-paid health and dental benefits 3155
Charitable donations tax credit 2280
Age credit 2260
Total 14905
Expressed as a share of tax revenue, federal tax expenditures have fluctuated since 1999,
falling from 13.75 per cent of tax revenues in that year to a low of 11.4 per cent in 2005
(Annex B). Tax expenditures peaked at 16.7 per cent of tax revenues in 2009, largely reflecting
the temporary home renovation tax credit, and, as noted above, are estimated to have fallen to
14.5 per cent of tax revenues in 2011.
REFORMING PROGRAM EVALUATION 
Program evaluation does not appear to be fulfilling its intended role in the expenditure
management process or its role in promoting accountability to Parliament and Canadians
generally. This section reviews the federal government’s evaluation policy, assesses the
contribution of evaluations to managing government spending and makes some proposals for
improving the situation. 
Federal evaluation policy
The 2006 Federal Accountability Act contains a provision that all grant and contribution
programs be evaluated every five years. This requirement was extended to all direct program
spending under the evaluation policy implemented in 2009. Evaluations of program
performance are intended to:34
• Help program managers assess the effectiveness and efficiency of programs;
• Be used to support spending proposals submitted to cabinet;
• Provide evidence for use in strategic reviews of program spending; and,
• Support accountability to Parliament and Canadians generally, in particular by requiring
that evaluations be made public.
The evaluation policy does not impose a specific evaluation methodology on departments but
does require that all evaluations address the following five core issues:35
1. Continued need for the program;
2. Alignment with government priorities;
3. Alignment with the federal government’s roles and responsibilities;
4. Demonstration of efficiency;36 and,
5. Achievement of expected outcomes (effectiveness).
34 Treasury Board Secretariat, “Policy on Evaluation” (2009). (http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=15024
35 See the Treasury Board Secretariat publication “Directive on the Evaluation Function” (2009). (http://www.tbs-
sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=15681&section=text#appA)
36 The text of the Directive states “demonstration of efficiency and economy” but the addition of “economy” is
redundant.
16
The first three issues are captured in the idea that evaluations should assess program relevance.
No explicit guidance is given on how to assess program efficiency or on what should be
included in the assessment. It would have been helpful to specify that costs incurred by
recipients in applying for government assistance are part of program delivery costs; this point
is taken up in more detail below. In assessing program effectiveness — the achievement of
expected outcomes — evaluators are to consider immediate, intermediate and ultimate
outcomes. No definitions of the various outcome measures are provided, but with respect to a
business subsidy program, the immediate outcome could be the receipt of the subsidy within
the time frames envisaged by the policy, the intermediate outcome could be the impact of the
subsidy on employment and output of the subsidized firms and the ultimate outcome could be
the net economic benefit of the subsidy. 
The evaluation policy does not cover statutory transfer payments, but the requirement to
evaluate these transfers is set out in the government’s Policy on Transfer Payments.37
However, departments are not required to evaluate statutory programs on a predetermined
cycle nor are they required to make the results public.38 Tax measures are excluded; they were
implicitly covered under the previous evaluation policy through general references to the
requirement to evaluate “policies, programs and initiatives.”39
An alternative evaluation framework — benefit-cost analysis
The core issues identified in the federal policy are sensible and the flexibility allowed in
undertaking evaluations is appropriate given the range of activities subject to the evaluation
policy: departmental budgets, statutory program delivery costs, business development programs
and transfers to individuals. The absence of an explicit definition of ultimate program
outcomes against which effectiveness would be assessed is, however, an important gap.
Without a well-defined common ultimate objective, it is more difficult to assess relative
program effectiveness and hence to use evaluations to support spending reallocation decisions.
This lack of precision also allows departments to assess program effectiveness against
intermediate outcomes, which can be misleading indicators of the benefits realized from the
program. For example, the ultimate objective of economic development programs is to improve
economic performance leading to higher living standards, so evaluators should be required to
assess effectiveness of these programs in terms of the net impact of the program on real
income.40 It is worth stressing that additional output or job creation is not an adequate measure
of success for an economic development program: over a complete business cycle, taxing one
group of firms and giving the proceeds to another group cannot do any more than change the
composition of output and employment. 
37 Treasury Board Secretariat “Policy on Transfer Payments” (April 2012). http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-
eng.aspx?id=13525&section=text
38 The Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates (Strengthening Parliamentary Scrutiny of
Estimates and Supply (June 2012) Recommendation 11) has recommended that standing committees review statutory
programs at least once every eight years.
(http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=5690996&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=
1&File=18)
39 Treasury Board Secretariat “Policy on Evaluation” (February 2001), page 3. (http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-
eng.aspx?id=12309)
40 Given the flexibility permitted in evaluation methods, program effectiveness is sometimes assessed in terms of the
net economic benefit to society. See, for example, Impact Evaluation of the NRC Industrial Research Assistance
Program – Final Report, which is available on request from NRC-IRAP.
17
This approach to effectiveness evaluation of program spending is surprising given the federal
government’s approach to regulatory policy, which requires departments and agencies to assess
the benefits and costs at all stages of the process: development, implementation, evaluation and
review. The objective is to provide evidence that will allow the government to choose the
instrument, regulatory or non-regulatory, that maximizes the net benefit to society as a whole.
Economic efficiency is not, however, the only criterion: departments and agencies are also
required to undertake an assessment of winners and losers from the policy change. In the
interest of transparency and accountability, departments and agencies “should prepare an
accounting statement to report on the quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits and costs of
significant proposals.”41 The presentation of both types of evidence “provides useful
information to decision makers, even when economic efficiency is not the only or the
overriding public policy objective.”42
The Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) has prepared a guide to help federal departments and
agencies perform the required benefit-cost analysis.43 In a nutshell, benefit-cost analysis
requires quantifying in monetary terms the benefits of an initiative and deducting all of the
costs incurred. The guide emphasizes the costs incurred by private sector entities in order to
comply with the regulation and the costs incurred by the government to administer, monitor
and enforce the regulation, but it also states that it may be necessary to include “indirect costs”
in the analysis. An example of an indirect cost is the loss in economic efficiency as capital and
labour are shifted from their market-determined use as a result of the regulation.44 Since the
benefits and costs occur over time, it is important to determine their present value using an
appropriate discount rate. 
The guide provides a detailed review of how to “monetize” the benefits from regulations when
market prices cannot be used, which is likely to be the case for regulations affecting, for
example, the environment, health and safety. The guide also discusses the situations in which
attributing a monetary value to the benefits cannot be done with sufficient precision. In these
cases, the guide recommends preparing a cost-effectiveness indicator, defined as the total cost
of the initiative (expressed in present value terms) divided by a relevant intermediate outcome
measure; in the case of a health-related initiative, the denominator could be the impact of the
measure on quality-adjusted years of life. This approach allows options to be ranked in terms
of the cost incurred to achieve a specific outcome, although differences in program scale are
not captured.
No explanation is available for the different requirements for evaluating program spending and
regulations. One reason for the lack of an explicit requirement for effectiveness evaluation of
programs may be the heterogeneity of direct program spending: operating budgets and program
delivery costs should be assessed in terms of efficiency rather than effectiveness. Further, not
all grants, contributions and other non-statutory transfers are substantial enough to justify the
in-depth benefit-cost analysis set out in the guide. In these circumstances, the reluctance to
impose a specific approach to effectiveness evaluation is understandable. Nevertheless, the  
41 Government of Canada Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation (2007), page 8.
42 Ibid, page 12.
43 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, The Canadian Cost-Benefit Analysis Guide: Regulatory Proposals (2007).
44 Ibid, page 26.
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benefit-cost framework is sound, so it should be applied even if a complete analysis is not
practical. Indeed, when applying benefit-cost analysis to regulations, departments are only
required to undertake quantitative analysis of “high value” regulations; when regulations with
limited impact are being considered, a qualitative discussion of benefits and costs is deemed
sufficient. 
Another possible reason for the different treatment is that monetizing the benefits from direct
programs is inordinately difficult, so the benefit-cost methodology cannot be applied. While
monetizing the benefits of policy measures implemented to promote economic development —
for example business subsidies such as the Industrial Research Assistance Program and
SR&ED — is challenging, the task is no more difficult than monetizing the benefits from
environmental regulation, for example. 
On the other hand, measures implemented to change the distribution of income have to be
assessed using the guide’s cost-effectiveness measure. While it is possible to determine the
economic cost of reducing income inequality through a specific program, there is no consensus
on how to monetize the benefits of reduced inequality.45 Calculating the economic cost of
achieving a given reduction in some measure of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient,46
would provide policy makers with useful information that would help assess the performance
of a program both in an absolute sense and relative to other programs. But, as emphasized in
the regulation directive, a cost-effectiveness measure would have to be supplemented with
other information, such as a detailed assessment of winners and losers. The best that can be
expected from a benefit cost analysis of income-distribution measures is a careful measurement
of costs and a detailed description of the income-distribution impacts that would allow policy
makers to perform their own subjective benefit-cost analysis and ranking of alternatives. 
Application to program spending and tax measures
The benefit-cost framework set out in the TBS guide can be applied to program spending and
tax expenditures with one substantial adjustment. In contrast to regulatory initiatives, program
spending and tax expenditures have to be financed with taxes. Higher taxes hurt economic
efficiency through adverse effects on incentives to work, save and invest. The size of the
negative impact rises and falls with tax rates; work by Dahlby and Ferede47 indicates that in
2010, raising an additional dollar in tax revenue (on average from all sources) reduced
economic output 26 cents. This cost, which applies to relatively small changes in tax revenue,
represents a substantial hurdle to finding a positive net benefit from economic development
measures and substantially raises the economic cost of measures implemented to change the
distribution of income.
45 Programs implemented to promote equity goals are likely to have negative impacts on real income by altering
incentives to work, save or invest. For example, pension-income splitting reduces the net income from working for
the lower-income spouse, so labour-force participation is likely to be adversely affected, which will reduce overall
output. These effects could in principle be monetized, but there is evidence that income inequality results in poorer
health outcomes and other social problems that affect social well-being, which would be more difficult to monetize.
See Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level (Penguin Books, 2010).
46 The Gini coefficient measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of income among individuals or groups of
individuals. This index can range from zero (equal distribution) to one (maximum inequality).
47 Dahlby, Bev and Ergete Ferede, “The Effects of Tax Rate Changes on Tax Bases and the Marginal Cost of Public
Funds for Provincial Governments,” Online Working Paper. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute (2011).
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In addition, compliance costs will generally be measured differently in a benefit-cost analysis
of program spending (or tax expenditures) than in an analysis of regulatory initiatives. To the
extent that the latter are being used to address issues, such as the environment, health and
safety, that are not priced in the market, all expenditures made to achieve the regulatory goal
impose a cost on society that is presumably offset by the benefits of a cleaner environment,
improved health or enhanced security. In the case of business subsidies, the additional output
induced by the subsidy is a social benefit offset by the output forgone in other non-subsidized
sectors; as a result, compliance costs would consist of costs incurred by businesses to apply for
the subsidy and to respond to follow-up questions by program administrators. 
An application of benefit-cost analysis to two economic development programs — the SR&ED
investment tax credit and the Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) direct assistance
program — is shown in Table 3.48 Both programs provide support for business investment in
R&D. The rationale for government intervention in this case is that the market fails to provide
the socially optimal amount of R&D. This market failure occurs because firms are unable to
capture all of the benefits from the R&D they undertake: despite their best efforts and the
benefits of patent protection, some of the knowledge gained from R&D leaks out or spills over
to other firms. These spillovers reduce production costs of other firms, which is a benefit to
society. The additional R&D induced by government subsidies therefore raises real income, as
shown in row 2 of Table 3.
TABLE 3: BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF SELECTED R&D SUPPORT PROGRAMS
($ millions of dollars)
1
Scientific Research and Experimental Development Investment Tax Credit.
2
Industrial Research Assistance Program.
3
SR&ED estimates based on Budget 2012 parameters; IRAP estimate based on 2009 program parameters; includes
technical and management advice provided.
4
Fixed expenses only; variable expenses are reflected in the spillover benefit and the resource reallocation effect.
Source: John Lester “Benefit-Cost Analysis of R&D Support Programs” 
Canadian Tax Journal / Revue Fiscal Canadienne (2012) 60:4.
48 See John Lester, “Benefit-Cost Analysis of R&D Support Programs,” Canadian Tax Journal / Revue Fiscale
Canadienne 60: 4, 1-44, for additional detail. 
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Amount received by firms3 1246 1145 93
Spillover Benefit to Society 617 467 55
Costs of Providing Assistance
Financing Cost 292 287 -28
Resource Reallocation Effect 87 193 -22
Administration Expenses4 15 21 -14
Compliance Costs4 59 120 -4
Net Benefit 163 -154 -12
As a % of program spending 13.1% -13.5% -13.4%
SR&ED1 IRAP2
Regular Credit Enhanced Credit 
The cost of financing government assistance with higher taxes turns out to be the biggest cost
associated with government intervention, as shown in row 4 of Table 3. Another substantial
cost arises from the reallocation of resources (row 5). Government intervention causes a loss in
economic efficiency by shifting capital and labour from their market-determined uses. This
point can be seen more easily by noting that with government assistance, R&D projects with a
below-market private rate of return become viable and that the lower return represents a loss in
economic output. In other words, government support shifts investment from activities where it
earns a competitive private return to activities where it earns a lower rate of return and this
puts downward pressure on the net economic benefit from providing assistance. Finally, costs
incurred by the government to deliver assistance, and compliance costs incurred by firms,
absorb resources that could be used more productively elsewhere.
The regular SR&ED tax credit results in a net economic benefit amounting to about 13 per cent
of the revenue forgone, while the enhanced credit and IRAP result in net losses amounting to
about 13 per cent of the subsidy received by firms. High administration and compliance costs
are the main reason why the enhanced credit and IRAP fail to generate a net benefit for society.
Administration and compliance costs amount to seven per cent of regular SR&ED benefits
received by firms, but these costs are 17 per cent of enhanced SR&ED benefits received and 36
per cent of IRAP benefits.49
Who should perform the evaluations?
Departmental evaluations of program effectiveness are not considered satisfactory by the
auditor general or by the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS). In a 2009 report, the auditor
general concluded that “departments were not able to demonstrate that they are fully meeting
needs for effectiveness evaluation.”50 This conclusion is based on a review of evaluations in six
departments over the four years ending in 2007-08. These departments prepared a total of 152
evaluations over the period reviewed, but only about a sixth of these evaluations addressed
program effectiveness. This view of effectiveness-evaluation is not new: in a 1993 report the
auditor general concluded that “program evaluations in the federal government are currently
directed at fine-tuning existing programs, rather than asking the tough questions about whether
the programs are still needed and what they have achieved.”51 In its latest annual review of the
evaluation function, the TBS stated that “the use of evaluations has not reached its potential for
informing expenditure decisions and policy development”52 due to weaknesses in effectiveness
evaluation. 
49 Ibid.
50 2009 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada, paragraph 1.15. (http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English
/parl_oag_200911_e_33252.html)
51 1993 Report of the Auditor General of Canada Chapter 1, paragraph 1.49. 
52 Treasury Board Secretariat, “Report on the Health of the Evaluation Function” (2010) p. 36.
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Both agencies attribute this state of affairs to a lack of the data required to measure program
effectiveness and to a limited supply of program evaluators. These are clearly important
factors, but in previous reports, the auditor general drew attention to the political context of
evaluations and to consequences of giving departments the responsibility for performing
evaluations of their own programs.53 Under the current evaluation policy, an independent group
within each department is responsible for evaluations; these evaluations are expected to be
made public along with a response from management. This approach gets full marks for
transparency, but evaluation managers reporting on program relevance and effectiveness may
end up providing information that could be used by political groups to embarrass the minister
and/or to set the political agenda. The natural reaction of evaluation managers in this situation
would be to do effectiveness evaluations of programs that are known to be functioning well; to
release effectiveness evaluations after a decision to change program parameters has been made
and announced by the minister; and to undertake evaluations that are focused on program
efficiency rather than effectiveness. 
The government of Canada has been trying to integrate program evaluation into expenditure
decisions and policy development since the evaluation policy was first formulated. Various
approaches have been tried to improve the usefulness of evaluations, but giving departments
the responsibility for undertaking evaluations has been a feature of evaluation policy since the
late 1970s. Enough time has passed to conclude that the structural resistance to undertaking
effectiveness evaluations will not be overcome as long as departments play the lead role. A
better approach would be to have an independent entity evaluate program effectiveness while
departments focus on evaluating program efficiency. This recommendation applies with equal
force to the tax expenditures identified in this study. Finance Canada should continue to have
responsibility for designing a fair and efficient tax system and assessing the results, but the
effectiveness of tax expenditures as defined in this study should be evaluated by a separate
agency. (See Box 2 for a review of tax expenditure evaluation by Finance Canada.)
It is worth noting that the evaluation function was centralized for periods of time in the 1960s
and 1970s. The last attempt was by the planning branch of the Treasury Board Secretariat from
1970 to 1978, which undertook both efficiency and effectiveness evaluations on a pilot basis.
The proposal in this study is to centralize relevance and effectiveness evaluations while leaving
efficiency evaluations with the appropriate line departments. 
53 See, for example, Report of the Auditor General of Canada (November 2000) paragraphs 19.122-3, and (1993)
paragraphs 1.55-57.
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Who should undertake the effectiveness evaluations? The office of the auditor general has the
credibility but not the mandate. The Auditor General Act states that reports to the House of
Commons “shall call attention to anything that he (the auditor general) considers to be of
significance”54 and specifically notes the issue of economy and efficiency in spending and the
need to ensure that measures to measure effectiveness are in place; this qualification rules out
an expansion of performance audits to include an assessment of effectiveness. 
In contrast, the mandate of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) is consistent with
undertaking evaluations of program spending. Section 79.2a of the Parliament of Canada Act55
states that the mandate of the PBO is to “provide independent analysis … about the state of the
nation’s finances, the estimates of the government and trends in the economy.” Further, under
section 79.3(1) of the act, departments are required to provide the PBO with “free and timely
access to any financial or economic data in the possession of the department that are required
for the performance of his or her mandate.”
54 Available on the Internet at: http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/A-17/20021231/P1TT3xt3.html
55 Available at: http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-1/page-30.html#docCont
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Box 2: Tax Evaluations in the Department of Finance
In the mid-1980s, the auditor general and
the House of Commons public accounts
committee recommended that Finance
Canada set up a formal, independent
evaluation process for tax measures.a As a
result, in 1987 a separate division was
created in the tax policy branch that was
responsible for evaluating tax measures.
The division was dismantled in 1991,
despite the misgivings of the public
accounts committee, in response to
pressures to reduce the department’s
operating costs. Policy divisions in the tax
policy branch were responsible for
undertaking evaluations until 1998, when a
separate group responsible for research on
tax policy issues and evaluations was
established. This change may have been in
response to criticisms by the auditor
general in a 1993 report that questioned
the adequacy of the resources allocated to
the evaluation function. A 1998 report by
the auditor general described Finance
Canada’s evaluation effort as modest
(paragraph 8.72), noting that only five tax
measures were evaluated over the eight
years ending in 1997. Since 1998, 11 tax
evaluations have been published, five of
which evaluated effectiveness to some
degree. Two of these five studies applied a
variant of the benefit-cost approach
proposed in this paper.
The relatively small number of published
evaluations does not imply that Finance
Canada is failing to monitor the tax system
or that it is failing to consult with
stakeholders. Tax measures are
continuously reviewed internally with
changes typically announced in the budget.
For example, in Budget 2012, the Scientific
Research and Experimental Development
and Atlantic provinces investment tax
credits were made less generous and the
overseas employment and corporate
mineral exploration tax credits were
eliminated. In addition, the department
regularly consults with stakeholders on tax
measures, the most recent example being
the review of the registered disability
savings plan. Finally, the department also
sets up advisory committees and panels,
such as the Advisory Panel on Canada’s
System of International Taxation.
Nevertheless, the point remains that tax
expenditures do not have to be evaluated
once every five years as is required for
spending programs.
a See Appendix C of the Report of the
Auditor General (1992) for additional
detail. http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/att_92ace_e_
7889.html  
The PBO does not, however, have a clear mandate to undertake analysis of tax expenditures.
Although analysis of the “state of the nation’s finances” could be interpreted broadly enough to
include evaluation of tax expenditures, the phrase appears to be intended to cover higher level
assessments of budgetary revenues, expenditures and balances. On the other hand, if the
government’s estimates are revised to include refundable tax credits, they would be clearly
covered by the PBO’s mandate. 
There is a strong case for expanding the PBO’s mandate to include evaluation of tax
expenditures.56 Centralizing effectiveness evaluation with the PBO would have other
advantages in addition to overcoming the structural resistance to undertaking such evaluations
in departments. First, effectiveness evaluation requires specialized data-analysis skills that are
independent of the program being evaluated, so some duplication of effort will be reduced
through centralization. Second, a centralized approach makes it easier to undertake a whole-of-
government approach to evaluations. 
Third, given the PBO’s direct linkage to Parliament, an expanded role for the PBO in
evaluation would encourage Parliament to take more interest in effectiveness reporting and to
reclaim some of the power of the purse that has been allowed, in the words of former senator
Lowell Murray, to “become a dead letter, their Supply and Estimates process an empty
ritual.”57 Having access to effectiveness evaluations of tax and spending programs prepared by
the Parliamentary Budget Officer would make it easier for Parliament to reassert its power of
the purse. More generally, the Parliamentary Budget Officer should become an officer of
Parliament reporting to the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates.58
This change would give the Parliamentary Budget Officer the same status as the auditor
general; it would also ensure a stable funding base consistent with an expanded mandate. 
There is also a good case for governments to pay private sector analysts and organizations to
undertake evaluations to complement efforts in the public sector. This approach could be a
cost-effective way of increasing the supply of evaluators while providing useful diversity in
methodological frameworks. Providing private sector access to the data required to evaluate tax
expenditures is, however, challenging given the confidentiality requirements of the Income Tax
Act; but there are ways around this restriction. For example, Statistics Canada allows
researchers to access personal income tax data (“micro” data) in secure research centres across
the country while suppressing names and addresses, as well as preventing release of any
information that would allow the identification of specific individuals. Statistics Canada has
recently extended this approach to business income tax data, although these data can only be
accessed in Ottawa.  
56 Revising the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s mandate to include effectiveness evaluations of tax expenditures would
automatically make the PBO eligible to have access to detailed taxpayer data under section 241(4)(k) of the Income
Tax Act.
57 Speech by senator Lowell Murray in Bouctouche, N.B. on October 13, 2011.
http://www.ipolitics.ca/2011/10/13/lowell-murray-you-do-not-govern-you-hold-to-account-those-who-do/. 
58 This status was recommended by several of the witnesses appearing before the standing committee on government
operations and estimates in its hearings on strengthening Parliamentary scrutiny of estimates and supply. The New
Democratic and Liberal parties submitted minority reports supporting this status as well.
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WHAT WOULD REFORM COST?
The reforms proposed in this study would not be costless to implement. More resources would
have to be devoted to developing the program performance data required for effectiveness
evaluations and to carry them out. Given that very few effectiveness evaluations are being
undertaken now, and that program performance data is in limited supply, it may very well be
necessary to double the resources allocated to evaluations. In 2009-10, the federal government
spent close to $80 million on program evaluation, which was about 0.1 per cent of the $95.4
billion in direct program spending in that year.59 A 2009 survey by the auditor general suggests,
however, that evaluation groups spend about 40 per cent of their time on tasks that are not
directly related to undertaking evaluations.60 As a result, an increase in the evaluation budget of
about $50 million is a reasonable approximation of the direct costs of the proposed reforms.
The increased budget would be split between departments, which would be responsible for
developing and collecting program performance data, and the Parliamentary Budget Officer
(PBO), who would be responsible for undertaking effectiveness evaluations. The increase in
the PBO’s budget, which was $2.8 million in the 2010-11 fiscal year, would be dramatic. The
limited supply of trained evaluators, which has been noted by both the auditor general and the
Treasury Board Secretariat, means that it will be difficult to increase the number of
effectiveness evaluations substantially in the short-term, so the PBO budget would be built up
over a number of years. This constraint reinforces the general point that the decision to
undertake an effectiveness evaluation of a program or tax measure would have to be based on a
careful assessment of the risk that the initiative is not functioning as intended and on the size
of the program.
SOME OBSTACLES TO REFORM
This section considers some of the potential impediments, both practical and political, to
reforming the expenditure management system. One factor dampening enthusiasm for reform
arises from the fact that not all tax expenditures reported by the government are similar to
spending programs delivered through the tax system. As discussed earlier, many tax
expenditures identified by governments are measures implemented with the goal of improving
the fairness and efficiency of the tax system; this heterogeneity makes it more difficult to make
a convincing case for including tax measures in expenditure reviews or, more generally, in
expenditure management systems. Careful analysis of measures described as tax expenditures
is required to determine which are roughly equivalent to spending programs delivered through
the tax system. 
A related issue is that tax expenditures involve an open-ended financial commitment: benefits
from a tax-based program are available to all applicants that meet the eligibility requirements.
As a result, an unexpectedly large number of applicants can result in higher-than-forecast costs
for a tax-based program, but not for a spending program, which has a well-defined upper limit. 
59 Treasury Board Secretariat, “Report on the Health of the Evaluation Function” (2010), page 12.
60 Report of the Auditor General of Canada (November 2000), paragraph 1.59. 
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Further, the lag in establishing final cost estimates will be longer for tax expenditures than for
spending programs: applications for tax credits are made in tax returns, so there can be a delay
by firms in making the application and a delay by the Canada Revenue Agency in approving it,
because it is just one element of many in a tax return. As a result, departmental allocations and
spending for tax-based programs would have to be provisional for several years. But the
uncertainty surrounding the cost of tax expenditures is not new; it is simply being shifted from
the revenue side of the budget to the spending side and distributed across departments. Nothing
of substance would change and departmental operations would not be affected. 
A third consideration is that an underlying motivation of expenditure management is containing
or reducing the size of government; reducing tax expenditures increases recorded revenue,
which raises the issue of consistency with the fundamental objective of the exercise. This is of
particular concern when expenditure review takes place in the context of fiscal consolidation,
since governments often commit to eliminating deficits without raising taxes. 
As suggested earlier, this concern is largely a matter of perception and accounting conventions.
With the new accounting standard, changing a refundable tax credit to a grant program would
show lower program spending and no change in tax revenue. But without further revisions to
the accounting framework, switching a non-refundable investment tax credit to a grant program
would cause both tax revenues and program spending to increase, although nothing of
substance would change. As with refundable credits, the government’s budget balance would
be unaffected as would the after-tax income of the recipient firms. Governments should follow
up on the new accounting standard and report program spending and tax revenues gross of all
tax-based spending programs, not just refundable tax credits. With a revised accounting
framework, eliminating a program delivered through the tax system would show lower
program spending and no change in tax revenue. 
Would allocation of responsibility for tax-based spending programs make tax reform — in
particular, base-broadening accompanied by lower tax rates — even more difficult than it is
now? With more players involved the answer would seem to be yes. But when assessing this
potential cost of reform, it is important to keep in mind that increased transparency, systematic
evaluation and the pressure from strategic reviews is likely to do more for program efficiency
than periodic — perhaps once in a generation — tax reform. 
There may also be a concern that allocating tax programs to spending departments will
impinge upon the tradition of budget secrecy, which is imposed in part to ensure that persons
or businesses cannot profit from upcoming budget changes61 and also in part to influence how
budget changes are communicated to the public. Giving program departments control over tax-
based spending programs will increase the number of people who are aware of proposed
budget changes, which would be expected to increase the probability of a breach in secrecy. A
breach about the implementation of new program or modification/elimination of an existing
program could allow persons or firms to change their behaviour to increase their benefits from
the change. This appears to be an unavoidable risk arising from integrating tax expenditures
into the expenditure management system. When assessing the importance of this risk it is
useful to bear in mind that while the likelihood of a breach will rise, the probability will remain
low. Further, the one-time cost of a breach has to be compared to the ongoing benefits from
better management of billions of dollars in program spending. 
61 Budget secrecy is a matter of parliamentary convention, not privilege, so the consequences of a breach do not result
in parliamentary sanctions. See House of Commons Procedure and Practice (2009),  chapter on “The Business of
Ways and Means”.
26
The proposals for reform made in this paper are likely to be resisted by the finance minister,
who would experience a reduction in power if they were implemented. As discussed earlier, the
minister would lose authority over a large number of existing tax-based spending programs as
well as the ability to implement, with the consent of the prime minister, new tax-based
spending programs without the approval of the relevant minister. The finance minister would,
nevertheless, retain sufficient power to manage the nation’s finances.  
Under current arrangements, the finance minister plays a major role setting the “fiscal
framework.” In consultation with the prime minister, the finance minister determines the
overall level of spending and establishes the revenue target along with the tax rates required to
generate the desired level of revenues.62 These powers would not be affected by the proposals
for reform in this paper.
In addition, the reform proposals would not eliminate Finance Canada’s role in developing
policy for measures “transferred” to other departments. As a central agency responsible for
providing economic and fiscal advice on the government’s policy agenda, Finance Canada
plays a key role in many issues without having responsibility for program delivery —
examples include areas such as justice and public safety, labour markets, income security and
aboriginal issues. To take a specific example, if SR&ED were to become part of the Industry
Canada portfolio, Finance Canada would continue to offer advice on the government’s
innovation agenda, the amount of resources that should be allocated to the agenda, and how the
budget allocation for innovation should be distributed. But the decision to change the policy
parameters of the SR&ED investment tax credit would no longer be made by the minister of
finance and the prime minister independently of the rest of the cabinet.
The government response to the recommendations of the standing committee on government
operations and the estimates gives a very clear idea of how the current government would react
to a more explicit proposal to integrate tax expenditures into the expenditure management
system. The government rejected the committee’s recommendation to include tax expenditures
in the appropriate departmental reports on plans and priorities, on the grounds that the “tax
system, including all tax expenditures, is the responsibility of the Minister of Finance.”63 The
general reason advanced for supporting the status quo is that other departments would not be
capable of incorporating broad tax considerations into assessments of tax expenditures.
Specific factors mentioned that must be taken into consideration when evaluating tax measures
include: interactions among the measures; the impact on the fairness and efficiency of the tax
system; provincial and international effects; fiscal implications; and general market reactions.
The government response also draws attention to the point that tax expenditures are reported
on a calendar-year basis, while program spending is reported for fiscal years. Finally, the
government response notes that tax expenditures can only be imperfectly allocated to
departments since a given measure may touch on the responsibilities of several departments.
The arguments made in support of maintaining the finance minister’s prerogatives are not
convincing. With respect to the need to evaluate tax measures within the broader context of the
tax system, a first point to make is that not all of the listed criteria are specific to tax measures.  
62 See Treasury Board of Canada, The Expenditure Management System of the Government of Canada, (1995) for a
detailed description of the roles within the expenditure management system. The report is available at
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/opepubs/TB_H/EXMA_e.asp.
63 House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, Strengthening Parliamentary
Scrutiny of Estimates and Supply (June 2012), “Government Response."
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The government considers the fiscal implications of, and market reaction to, all policy
measures, not just taxes. And the finance minister would continue to be the key player
assessing consistency with the fiscal framework and the government’s policy objectives.
Second, existing tax measures have already been vetted by the minister of finance, so it is safe
to assume that they satisfy the concerns listed in the government’s response that are unique to
tax policy. Further, new measures proposed by departments would also be vetted by the finance
minister, so the main argument advanced against allocating tax expenditures to departments has
no substance. 
Similarly, the different reporting periods for tax expenditures and program spending is a non-
issue: the underlying data source for fiscal-year tax revenues is calendar-year tax collections
but there is no suggestion that revenues and expenditures are not comparable. 
Pointing out that it may not be possible to allocate tax expenditures to departments with
complete precision ignores the fact that program spending is imperfectly allocated, in part
because some spending programs cut across the responsibilities of several departments. For
example, Statistics Canada is included in the Industry Canada portfolio, but its spending could
be allocated across many departments. 
The government also commented on the committee’s recommendation that it be given a
mandate by the House of Commons to study the reporting arrangements of the Parliamentary
Budget Officer (PBO), including the possibility that the PBO report to directly to Parliament.
The response notes that both the mandate and the reporting arrangements of the PBO were
studied by the standing joint committee on the Library of Parliament and that the joint
committee found the services envisaged for the PBO to be a natural extension of the services
provided by the library. While indirect, the message is clear and hardly surprising. The normal
reaction of governments is to resist strengthening the PBO, since to do so would reduce their
power and flexibility. While there is a solid case for expanding the role of the PBO, such a
change could be deferred until tax-based spending programs are allocated to departments and
reports to Parliament are changed to include these programs. 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE REFORMED SYSTEM
This section provides a summary of the key responsibilities of the major players in a reformed
expenditure management system.
Minister of Finance and Department 
• Continue to be responsible for designing and monitoring a fair and efficient tax system as
well as for drafting the legislation for all tax measures; 
• Prepare estimates of the forgone revenue from tax expenditures and monitor the results for
unintended revenue losses; and,
• Screen proposals for new tax expenditures for consistency with a fair and efficient tax
system.
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Program Departments
• Include in their budgets the tax expenditures, as defined in this study, that are relevant to
their mandates;
• Undertake efficiency evaluations of all direct program spending and relevant tax
expenditures. These evaluations would cover both administration and compliance costs; in
the case of tax expenditures, it may be appropriate to undertake these efficiency evaluations
in collaboration with the Canada Revenue Agency; 
• Ensure that the program performance data required to undertake effectiveness evaluations is
available;
• Include tax expenditures in their strategic reviews; 
• Initiate proposals for new tax expenditures and to modify the generosity of tax expenditures
or eliminate them; and,
• Approve new tax expenditures proposed by the minister of finance that are relevant to their
mandate.
The Treasury Board and Secretariat
• Allocate tax expenditures to program departments;
• Revise the presentation of program spending to include refundable tax credits and present
budgetary revenues gross of refundable credits; and,
• Revise the presentation of the Estimates to include all other tax expenditures in both the
government’s expenditure plan and the Main Estimates as information on non-voted spending.
The Parliamentary Budget Officer 
• Undertake evaluations of the relevance and effectiveness of selected direct program
spending and tax expenditures as defined in this study, and report to the standing committee
on government operations and estimates on the findings. 
House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates 
• Review the relevance and effectiveness evaluations prepared by the Parliamentary Budget
Officer and report to Parliament on the findings.
Parliament
• Change the enabling legislation for the Parliamentary Budget Officer so that the holder is
an officer of Parliament reporting to the standing committee on government operations and
estimates.  
• Provide funding commensurate with the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s expanded mandate.
CONCLUSION
The federal government has set up an expenditure management system with great potential for
improving the effectiveness of government spending. In order to maximize the new system’s
potential, two changes should be made: tax expenditures should be integrated into the
expenditure management system and responsibility for effectiveness evaluations of tax and
spending programs should be given to an independent agency such as the Parliamentary
Budget Officer. Effectiveness evaluations should be carried out using a variant of the benefit-
cost framework that is now applied to government regulatory initiatives. 
29
ANNEX A: FEDERAL BUDGETARY SPENDING IN 2010-11
In 2010-11, federal government budgetary spending was $270 billion. The percentage
distribution across major categories is shown in Chart A-1. Program spending, defined as total
spending less public debt charges, was $240 billion. Direct program spending is subject to the
government’s formal evaluation policy. It is obtained by deducting “major” (statutory) transfers
to persons and other levels of government from program spending. 
CHART A-1: FEDERAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES 2010-11
Percentage Distribution
Direct program spending was $118 billion in 2010-11. Operating expenses of departments,
Crown corporations and agencies account for almost 70 per cent of direct program spending.
(Chart A-2) “Other” transfers to persons and industry account for the remainder, or about $37
billion. These transfer payments are split roughly 90 per cent / 10 per cent between transfers to
persons and business subsidies. 
CHART A-2: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DIRECT PROGRAM SPENDING 2010-11
Percentage Distribution
30
Direct program
spending, 43.8%
Public debt
charges, 11.4%
Major transfers to
persons, 25.2%
Major transfers to other levels
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Federal spending in 2010-11 (billions)
Total: $270.5;  Program Spending: $239.6; Direct Program Spending: $118.5 
Transfer payments
to persons, 28.3%
National Defence,
18.0%
All other departments 
and agencies, 42.1%
Transfer payments
to industry, 2.8%
Crown
corporations, 8.9%
Federal direct program spending in 2010-11 (billions)
Operating expenses of departments (ex. defence):       $60.4
National Defence: $21.3
Transfers to persons: $33.5
Transfers to industry: $3.3
The data on budgetary spending used in this section was taken from the Annual Financial
Report of the Government of Canada published in 2011, which includes the Canada Child Tax
Benefit in budgetary spending. As noted in the text, this $10 billion program is not included in
the Estimates tabled in Parliament.
Table A-1 shows federal government transfer payments to persons and industry along with the
revenue forgone through the tax expenditures identified in this study. Note that personal
income tax measures providing support for business (e.g. the labour-sponsored venture capital
corporation tax credit) and business tax measures that have a social objective (e.g. deductions
for charitable donations) have been reallocated according to their ultimate objective. Tax-based
support programs amount to about 70 per cent of the value of government direct spending on
support programs. Both tax and spending programs are highly-oriented to persons, although
less so for tax-based programs.
TABLE A-1: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TAX AND SPENDING SUPPORT PROGRAMS 2010-11
(Billions of $)
1 Transfers to persons and industry.
Sources: Annual Financial Report of the Government of Canada, the Public Accounts of Canada,
Tax Expenditures and Evaluations, author’s calculations.
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Support for:
Industry 3.3 9.9 13.2
Persons 33.5 16.1 49.6
Total 36.8 26.0 62.8
Program Spending 1 Tax Measures Combined Support
ANNEX B: EVOLUTION OF TAX EXPENDITURES 1999-2011
From 1999 to 2011, tax expenditures edged up from 13.8 per cent to 14.5 per cent of tax
revenues (Chart B-1). Over this period, the share of personal income tax expenditures in total
tax revenues rose about two percentage points while the share of corporate income tax
expenditures fell slightly more than one percentage point and the share of GST tax
expenditures was almost unchanged. The increase in the relative importance of personal
income tax measures primarily reflects the introduction of 11 new measures starting in 2004
(Table B-1), which raised the share by 1.2 percentage points. The spike in the share of personal
income tax expenditures in 2009 is the result of the temporary home renovation tax credit,
which increased the share 1.4 percentage points. The decline in the relative importance of
corporate income tax expenditures is largely the result of eliminating the low rate for
manufacturing and processing, which was phased out over the 2001-04 period. 
CHART B-1 TAX EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF FEDERAL TAX REVENUES 1999 TO 2011
32
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
Personal Income Tax Corporate Income Tax GST
TABLE B-1: NEW AND ELIMINATED TAX EXPENDITURES 1999 TO 2011
($ millions)
S  =  less than $2.5 million
Source: various issues of Tax Expenditures and Evaluations.
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Personal Income Tax
Children’s Arts Tax Credit 2011 100
Volunteer Firefighters’ Tax Credit 2011 15
Agri-Québec (farm savings account) 2011 5
First-Time Home Buyers’ Tax Credit 2009 115
Registered Disability Savings Plan 2008 4
Pension income splitting 2007 925
Working Income Tax Benefit 2007 1,030
Children’s Fitness Tax Credit 2007 115
AgriInvest (farm savings account) 2007 15
Tax credit for Public Transit Passes 2006 150
Deduction for income earned by military and police deployed to 2004 38
high-risk international missions
Subtotal (11 measures) 2,512
Corporate Income Tax
Agri-Québec (farm savings account) 2011 S
Deductibility of gifts of medicine 2007 S
AgriInvest (farm savings account) 2007 3
Investment Tax Credit for Child Care Spaces 2007 S
Agricultural co-operatives — patronage dividends issued as shares 2006 4
Apprenticeship job creation tax credit 2006 81
Corporate mineral exploration tax credit 2003 26
Subtotal (7 measures) 114
Goods and Services Tax
Rebate for foreign conventions and tour packages 2007 10
Rebates for new residential rental property 2000 60
Subtotal (2 measures) 70
New Measures Total 2,696
Corporate Income Tax
Political Contribution Tax Credit 2008 10
Low Rate for Manufacturing & Processing 2001-04 1,900
GST
Rebate for foreign visitors 2007 79
Eliminated Measures Total 1,989
New Measures Effective Date Value in 2011
Eliminated Measures Effective Date Value in 1999
ANNEX C: RESPONSIBILITY CENTRES FOR TAX EXPENDITURES 
Table C-1 presents a preliminary assignment of tax expenditures by department. All tax
expenditures as defined in this study are included in the table even if no estimates of the tax
revenue forgone are currently available, since revenue-loss estimates may become available for
some measures in the future. In addition, it is useful for departments to be aware of all of the
tax benefits provided for a particular activity or sector, even if the benefit cannot be quantified.
The assignment of tax expenditures should be considered preliminary. As recommended by the
standing committee on government operations and estimates,64 a definitive allocation should be
undertaken by the Treasury Board Secretariat.
64 House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, Strengthening Parliamentary
Scrutiny of Estimates and Supply (June 2012), Recommendation 12.
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TABLE C-1: ALLOCATION OF TAX EXPENDITURES BY DEPARTMENT AND PROGRAM ACTIVITY CATEGORY
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Aboriginals
Non-taxation of income of status Indians Indian and Northern Affairs – n.a. n.a.
and Indian bands on reserve Aboriginal Economic Development
Non-taxation of personal property of status Indians Indian and Northern Affairs – n.a. n.a.
and Indian bands on reserve Aboriginal Economic Development
Arts and Culture
Children’s Arts Tax Credit Canadian Heritage – Arts 100 100
Donations of cultural property Canadian Heritage – Culture 24 10 34
Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit Canadian Heritage – Culture 255 255
Non-deductibility of advertising expenses in foreign Canadian Heritage – Culture S S
media
Charities and Community Service
Tax-free amount for emergency service volunteers Canadian Heritage – Engagement  12
and Community Participation
Volunteer Firefighters Tax Credit Canadian Heritage – Engagement 15
and Community Participation
Deductibility of gifts to the Crown Canadian Heritage – Engagement S
and Community Participation
Donations of ecologically sensitive land Environment Canada – Sustainable 9 10 19
Ecosystems
Deductibility of gifts of medicine Foreign affairs and International Trade S
Charitable Donations Tax Credit (including securities) HRSDC – social development 2,430 457 2,887
Non-taxation of registered charities HRSDC – Social Development n.a.
Non-taxation of other non-profit organizations HRSDC – Social Development 85 85
(other than registered charities)
Exemption for certain supplies made by charities HRSDC – Social Development 810 810
and non-profit organizations
Political Contribution Tax Credit Parliament 32 32
Economic Development – Farming and Fishing
Lifetime capital gains exemption for farm and Agriculture – 335 335
fishing property Business Risk Management
Cash basis accounting Agriculture – n.a. n.a.
Business Risk Management
Deferral of capital gains through intergenerational Agriculture – n.a.
rollovers of family farms, family fishing businesses Business Risk Management
and commercial woodlots
Deferral of income from destruction of livestock Agriculture – S S
Business Risk Management
Deferral of income from sale of livestock during Agriculture –
drought, flood or excessive moisture years Business Risk Management n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tax Expenditure                         Responsible Department – Value in 2011 ($ millions)
Program Activity Personal Business GST Total
Income Tax Income Tax
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Deferral of income from grain sold through cash Agriculture – Business Risk Management 30 -9 21
purchase tickets
Deferral through 10-year capital gain reserve Agriculture – Business Risk Management S S
Exemption from making quarterly tax instalments Agriculture – Business Risk Management n.a. n.a.
AgriInvest (farm savings account) Agriculture – Business Risk Management 15 3 18
Agri-Québec (farm savings account) Agriculture – Business Risk Management 5 S 5
Flexibility in inventory accounting Agriculture – Business Risk Management n.a. n.a. n.a.
Agricultural co-operatives – patronage dividends Agriculture – Business Risk Management 4 4
issued as shares
Exemption for farmers’ and fishers’ insurers Agriculture – Business Risk Management 6 6
Zero-rating of agricultural and fish products Agriculture – Business Risk Management S S
and purchases
Economic Development – General
Overseas Employment Credit Eliminated in Budget 2012 75 75
Accelerated deduction of capital costs Finance n.a. n.a. n.a.
Deferral through use of billed-basis accounting Finance n.a. n.a.
by professionals
Investment tax credits1 Finance 16 16
Exemption from tax for international banking centres Industry Canada – Industrial n.a. n.a.
Competitiveness and Capacity
Surtax on the profits of tobacco manufacturers Health – Health Promotion n.a. n.a.
Apprenticeship Job Creation Tax Credit HRSDC – Skills and Employment 81 81
Investment Tax Credit for Child Care Spaces HRSDC – Skills and Employment S S
Employee stock option deduction HRSDC – Skills and Employment 725 725
Film or Video Production Services Tax Credit Industry Canada – Industrial 110 110
Competitiveness and Capacity
Low tax rate for credit unions Industry Canada – Industrial 60 60
Competitiveness and Capacity
Holdback on progress payments to contractors Industry Canada – Industrial 39 39
Competitiveness and Capacity
Rebate for foreign conventions and tour packages Industry Canada – Industrial 10 10
Competitiveness and Capacity
Zero-rating of certain purchases made by exporters Industry Canada – Industrial S S
Competitiveness and Capacity
Economic Development – R&D
SR&ED Investment tax Credit Industry – Research and 3,655 3,655
Development Financing
Tax Expenditure                         Responsible Department – Value in 2011 ($ millions)
Program Activity Personal Business GST Total
Income Tax Income Tax
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Economic Development – Natural Resources
Flow-through share deductions Natural Resources – Economic 280 60 340
Opportunities for natural resources
Mineral Exploration Tax Credit for flow-through Natural Resources – Economic 125 125
share investors Opportunities for natural resources
Reclassification of expenses under flow-through Natural Resources – Economic -3 -3
shares Opportunities for natural resources
Logging Tax Credit Natural Resources – Economic S 8 8
Opportunities for natural resources
Corporate Mineral Exploration and Eliminated in Budget 2012 26 26
Development Tax Credit
Deductibility of contributions to a qualifying Natural Resources – Economic S S
environmental trust Opportunities for natural resources
Reclassification of expenses under flow-through Natural Resources – Economic S S
shares Opportunities for natural resources
Earned depletion2 Finance 11 11
Economic Development – Regional
Atlantic Investment Tax Credit Industry Canada – Community 273 273
Economic Development
Northern residents deductions Industry Canada – Community 165 165
Economic Development
Economic Development – Small business 0
Lifetime capital gains exemption for Industry Canada – Small Business 560 560
small business shares
Rollovers of investments in small businesses Industry Canada – Small Business 5 5
Deferral through 10-year capital gain reserve Industry Canada – Small Business S S
Low tax rate for small businesses Industry Canada – Small Business 3,555 3,555
Entrepreneurship
Deduction of allowable business investment losses Industry – Small Business Research, 30 13 43
Advocacy and Services
Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations Industry – Small Business Research, 130 130
Credit Advocacy and Services
Non-taxation of provincial assistance for venture Industry – Small Business Research, n.a. n.a. n.a.
investments in small businesses Advocacy and Services
Education
Registered Lifelong Learning Plan HRSDC – Social Development n.a. n.a.
Transfer of education, tuition and textbook HRSDC – Social Development 510 510
tax credits
Exemption of scholarship, fellowship and HRSDC – Social Development 43 43
bursary income
Registered Education Savings Plans HRSDC – Social Development 185 185
Student Loan Interest Credit HRSDC – Social Development 68 68
Tax Expenditure                         Responsible Department – Value in 2011 ($ millions)
Program Activity Personal Business GST Total
Income Tax Income Tax
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Health
Children’s Fitness Tax Credit Canadian Heritage – Sport 115 115
Non-taxation of business-paid health and Health – Health Promotion 3,155 3,155
dental benefits
Zero-rating of prescription drugs Health – Health Promotion 740 740
Housing
First-Time Home Buyers’ Tax Credit HRSDC – Housing 115 115
Registered Homebuyers’ Plan HRSDC – Housing n.a.
Income support – Age-related
Age Credit HRSDC – Income Security 2,260 2,260
Pension Income Credit HRSDC – Income Security 975 975
Pension income splitting HRSDC – Income Security 925 925
U.S. Social Security benefits HRSDC – Income Security S S
Non-taxation of Guaranteed Income Supplement HRSDC – Income Security 105 105
and Allowance benefits
Income support – Veterans
Non-taxation of veterans’ allowances, income Veterans’ Affairs – Financial S S
support benefits and other service pensions Support Program
Non-taxation of veterans’ disability pensions Veterans’ Affairs – disability and 140 140
and support for dependants death compensation 
Non-taxation of veterans’ Disability Awards Veterans’ Affairs – disability and 35 35
death compensation 
Income Support – Other
Non-taxation of strike pay 3 Finance n.a. n.a.
Non-taxation of social assistance benefits HRSDC – Income Security 145 145
Non-taxation of certain amounts received as HRSDC – Income Security 22 22
damages in respect of personal injury or death
Non-taxation of workers’ compensation benefits HRSDC – Income Security 645 645
Non-taxation of up to $10,000 of death benefits HRSDC – Income Security n.a. n.a.
Treatment of alimony and maintenance payments HRSDC – Income Security 100 100
Deduction for certain contributions by individuals HRSDC – Income Security S S
who have taken vows of perpetual poverty
Deduction for clergy residence HRSDC – Income Security 85 85
Employee benefit plans HRSDC – Income Security n.a. n.a.
Working Income Tax Benefit HRSDC – Skills and Employment 1,030 1,030
Non-taxation of RCMP pensions/compensation Public Safety – RCMP n.a. n.a.
in respect of injury, disability or death
Tax Expenditure                         Responsible Department – Value in 2011 ($ millions)
Program Activity Personal Business GST Total
Income Tax Income Tax
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Persons with disabilities
Registered Disability Savings Plans HRSDC – Income Security 4 4
Refundable Medical Expense Supplement HRSDC – Income Security 140 140
Other
Deduction for income earned by military and National Defence – International Peace,
police deployed to high-risk international missions Stability and Security 38 38
Public Transit Tax Credit Transport – Transportation Infrastructure 150 150
Deductibility of countervailing and Foreign affairs and International Trade n.a. n.a.
anti-dumping duties
Deductibility of earthquake reserves Industry Canada – Industrial S S
Competitiveness and Capacity
Deferral through use of billed-basis accounting Industry Canada – Industrial n.a. n.a.
by professional corporations Competitiveness and Capacity
Exemption and rebate for legal aid services Justice – Stewardship of Canadian 25 25 
Legal Framework
Total 16,105 8,712 1,585 26,375
Tax Expenditure                         Responsible Department – Value in 2011 ($ millions)
Program Activity Personal Business GST Total
Income Tax Income Tax
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